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THE LAW OF INSURABLE INTEREST IN
NORTH CAROLINA
HERMAN LERoY TAYLOR*
I. INTRODUCTORY
One who has no insurable interest in the subject matter of a contract
of insurance may not recover on such contract. This rule is all but
universally recognized.' Although the rule is apparently simple on its
face, its application to a given set of facts has involved considerable
difficulty, because of the varying contractual and other legal relation-
ships in which the question of insurable interest arises. A considera-
tion of the cases in which the problem has been treated will impress one
with the fact that the resulting difficulty stems chiefly from disagreement
among the courts on two issues which are fundamental in the theory of
insurable interest: (1) the rationale behind the requirement of insurable
interest and (2) what constitutes an insurable interest.
Although there is some evidence to the contrary,"* the majority of
the American courts adopted the view that the doctrine of insurable in-
terest, as it finally evolved in English law, was directed primarily
against the use of contracts of insurance for purely gaming or wagering
purposes,2 and it was this rationale which most of them adopted.8
* B.S., Virginia Union University; M.S., LL.B., Columbia University; Editor,
Columbia Law Review; Member New York Bar; Professor of Law, North Car-
olina College for Negroes.
'Crotty v. Union Mutual L. Ins. Co., 144 U. S. 621, 36 L. ed. 566 (1891);
Trinity College v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 N. C. 244, 18 S. E. 175 (1893) ; VANcE,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 119.
" While it appears that the prohibition against insurance on lives without in-
terest was directed against wagering [see preamble to Statute 14 Geo. III, C. 48
(1774): "Whereas it hath been found by experience, that the making insurance
on lives, or other events, wherein the assured shall have no interest, .hath mt -
duced a mischievous kind of gaming . . ."], the preamble to Statute 19 Geo.
C. 37 (1746), which prohibits insurance on property without interest, clearly inni-
cates that aside from the element of wagering, other evils or "pernicious practices"
(e.g., fraudulent destruction of ships and cargoes, unfair trade practices, etc.)
were aimed at by the statute.
I A controversy early developed among the American courts as to the status
of contracts of insurance not founded upon insurable interest at English common
law. The controversy was the result of a further controversial matter, viz., the
status of wager contracts at common law. Historically, it appears that under the
common law theory of "freedom of contract," wager contracts were held enforce-
able. Subsequently, however, the courts without the aid of statutes, began to
restrict actions to wagers which were innocently made and not injurious in their
consequences to the public. [See March v. Pigot, 5 Bur. 2802, 98 Eng. Rep. 471
(1771) ; Shepherd v. Sawyer, 6 N. C. 26 (1811)]. As to insurance contracts, it
appears that at an early period, except for "interest or no interest" marine policies
[see Dean v. Dicker, 2 Strange 1250, 93 Eng. Rep. 1162 (1746)] an interest in
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Others of the American courts, notably those of Texas,4 probably being
impelled by local considerations,' adopted the view that the policy be-
hind the requirement of insurable interest .was that of reducing the
incentive on the part of the assured to bring to pass the event insured
against.6 It may be apparent from close consideration that if these
two theories be kept separate and distinct, the application of one or the
other to a given factual situation would correspondingly vary the result
reached by the court. For example, A and B are man and wife. B
takes out a policy of insurance on the life of A. Subsequently A and
B are divorced, and subsequent to that A dies. 1B sues to collect on the
insurance policy as the beneficiary thereunder. Now, if the suit is
brought in a jurisdiction which recognizes as the purpose of insurable
interest the desire to discourage or prevent wagering, the contract being
valid in its inception, that is, the relationship between A and B at the
time the policy was taken out. being such as to negative any possible
imputation of wagering, B will be allowed to recover. On the other
hand, if the suit is brought in a jurisdiction which has adopted the other
rationale, viz., the desire to reduce the incentive to destroy the subject
the subject of the insurance was essential. (Le Cras v. Hughes, 3 Doug. 81, 99
Eng. Rep. 549 (1782). On this point compare the view of Ruse v. Mut., etc., Ins.
Co., 23 N. Y. 516 (1861) (insurable interest required at common law) with that
of Trenton Mutual, etc., Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 24 N. J. L. 576 (1854) (insurable
interest not required at common law)] ;- however, the subsequent recognition of in-
nocent wager contracts also penetrated the field of insurance, so that contracts of
insurance involving innocent wagers were sustained, despite the absence of in-
surable interest. [Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251(1876); Riggs v. Commercial Mut. L. Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 7, 25 N. E. 1058(1890)]. Although the courts later began to temper this view [see Cousins v.
Naptes, 3 Taunt. 513, 128 Eng. Rep. 203 (1811) (intent to wager must be indi-
cated on face of policy)], it was only by the intervention of Parliament that in-
surable interest was finally required to validate all contracts of insurance-Statute
19 Geo. II, c. 37, secs. 1, 2 (1746), covering property insurance, and Statute 14
Geo. III, c. 48 (1774), covering life insurance.
' See the statement of the U. S. Supreme Court in Grigsby v. Russell, 222
U. S. 149, 156, 56 L. ed. 133 (1911): ". .. the ground of the objection to life in-
surance without interest in the earlier English cases was not the temptation to
murder, but the fact that such wagers came to be regarded as a mischievous kind
of gaming."
'"It is against the public policy of this state to allow any who has no in-
surable interest to be the owner of a policy of insurance upon the life of a human
being.... In some states it is held that an element of wagering likewise enters
into such contracts, which has led, as we believe, to incofisistencies in the decisions
in some of the courts. Our court has placed the inhibition against such contracts
upon the higher and sounder ground that the public, independent of the consent
or concurrence of the parties, has an interest that no inducement shall be offered
to one man to take the life of another." Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W.
274, 275 (1894).
' It has been suggested that the "western" atmosphere prevailing in Texas,
where guns were considered a normal part of daily attire and where life was to
the one "who drew the quickest and aimed the straightest," was probably the
motivating spirit behind the adoption of this rule.
' For a critical evaluation of the Texas rule, see Hallen, The Texas Rule of
Insurable Interest, (1931) 9 TEX. L. REV. 333.
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matter of the insurance as a means of hastening the time of recovery, B
would be denied recovery, as, being no longer the wife of A, she would
likely have a greater interest in his death than in his continued existence
and thereby be tempted to bring the former to pass. It is generally
held that in such instances the existence of insurable interest at the in-
ception of the policy makes no difference. In many of the cases the
courts employed these two concepts concurrently and indiscriminately,
treating them as two parts of one whole.7
On the part of what constitutes an insurable interest, no definition
can be constructed which would have universal application. In general,
one is deemed to havean insurable interest in the subject matter insured
if he will derive pecuniary benefit or advantage from its preservation,
or will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its destruction, termination
or injury by the happening of the contingency insured against.8 Present
in this generally accepted criterion of insurable interest, however, are
other ambiguities. For example, not every "possibility of pecuniary
loss to the insured" gives rise to insurable interest, as "mere expect-
ancies," though having the status of property for some purposes,9 are
generally conceded as unfit subjects for insurance, the rule being that
the right giving rise to insurable interest must have some foundation in
law, i.e., must be capable of legal recognition.' 0
The situation has been further confused by the tendency among the
courts to apply the same criteria to determine what is an insurable in-
terest for purposes of life insurance as are applied in connection with
property insurance, failing to recognize that a fundamental difference
between the two types of insurance contracts requires a difference in
treatment of the question of insurability of the interests involved. In-
surance on property is primarily, if not wholly, for the purpose of
indemnity, that is, to recoup to the owner of the property loss resulting
from its destruction, by shifting the burden from him to others wh?
agreed to accept it for a price commensurate with the risk involved.
Life insurance, on the contrary, excepting perhaps the situation where
insurance is procured by a creditor on the life of a debtor as security
against the death of the latter before the repayment of the debt,'1 is
Cf. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 779, 26 L. ed. 924 (1882) ; Burbage v.
Windley, 108 N. C. 357, 361, 12 S. E. 839 (1891).
'Lucena v. Crauford, 2 B. & P. N. R. 269, 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (1805) ; VAx'cE,
INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) 124.
'In New York expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alienable. New
York Real Prop. Law, §59.
"o "It is well settled that a mere hope or expectation, which may be frustrated
by the happening of some event, is not an insurable interest." Riggs v. Commercial
Mut. Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 7, 25 N. E. 1058, 1059 (1890). See Lucena v. Crauford,
2 B. & P. N. R. 269, 324, 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (1805).
"To the effect that creditor insurance is "indemnity," see Wash. Central Bank
v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195, 205 (1888); Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, 104 Ga.
446, 31 S. E. 459 (1898).
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generally recognized as a contract of investment, and not one of in-
demnity, 12 for the reason generally assigned that no definite value can
be placed upon human life. Thus, while, in the case of property in-
surance, the presence or absence of insurable interest can be determined
rather simply by whether or not the immediate or direct result of the
happening of the contingency insured against is a pecuniary loss to the
insured, which is deducible from comparatively readily ascertainable
facts, no such determination can normally be made in life insurance be-
cause of the presence there of abstract and subjective factors which will
not yield readily, if at all, to the affixation of the dollar "sign.13 It is
obvious, therefore, that the application of the "indemnity" concept of
property insurance to life insurance would rule out recovery by the
insured in many instances where application of the investment theory
would permit recovery.
Despite the fact that the courts may have pursued separate paths in
quest of the determinant of insurable interest, they have been more or
less uniform on the point of the quantum of interest necessary to give
rise to an insurable interest, holding with general liberality, that any
interest cognizable either in law or in equity is an insurable interest.14
Irrespective of what may be considered to be the proper rationale
behind the doctrine of insurable interest and despite the differences in
opinion as to what constitutes an insurable interest, there is general
recognition among the courts of factors extrinsic to contracts of in-
surance which warrant abridging "freedom of contract" in the interest
of a greater "public policy" which can be effectuated only by the super-
vising hand of "the law."' 5
II. INSURABLE INTEREST IN PROPERTY
The first reported case in North Carolina involving the problem of
insurable interest was Shepherd v. Sawyer. 6 It may be noted that as
the contract involved was insurance on the life of a slave, and as slaves
"VANCE, INSURANCE (2d. ed. 1939) 80. But cf. Howell v. American National
Ins. Co. 189 N. C. 212, 214, 126 S. E. 603 (1925) (a contract of life insurance is pri-
marily a contract for indemnity). The ordinary contract of life insurance may,
however, partake of the nature of indemnity. If, for example, a person's life is
insured for an amount equal to his expected earnings, computed by multiplying
his life expectancy by his expected annual earnings; and taking the present value
thereof, such insurance, since it is intended to recoup to the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries this loss of earnings, is to that extent designed for indemnification.
"3 See Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251,
253 (1877), where the court said: "In marine and fire insurance the difficulty is
not so great because there the insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity.
But in life insurance the loss can seldom be measured by pecuniary values."
" Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. L. Ins. Assoc. of N. C., 125 N. C. 389, 394, 34
S. E. 503 (1899).
15 On this point, see the discussion in Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life,
(1918) 18 COL. L. Ray. 381, 383-385.
"86 N. C. 26 (1811).
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were generally considered property,17 the case might have been consid-
ered from the aspect of either property or life insurance. The theory of
the case appeared to be that of insurance on property. On the other
hand, it is significant to note that a later case, Burbage v. Windley,' s
involving the question of insurable interest in life, is reported to have
overruled the Sawyer case.
The decision in the Sawyer case was apparently the result of the
early attitude in the state courts on the question of the validity of wager-
ing contracts and of the effect of the presence of the wager element in
contracts of insurance. Although the plaintiff in the Sawyer case ap-
peared to have had no property rights in the slave and, therefore, had
no insurable interest in his life, the court held that inasmuch as the
plaintiff's wager was an innocent one and inasmuch as such wagers were
enforceable at common law, the plaintiff could recover on the undertak-
ing. This doctrine endured in the state, however, no longer than the
very next case involving the question of insurable interest to be consid-
ered by the state Supreme Court. This statement contradicts the report
that the Sawyer case was overruled by the Winley case; it is believed,
however, that foundation for this view rests in a consideration of the
case of Lockhart v. Cooper,'9 in which the court repudiated the theory
expounded in the Sawyer case, although it made no specific reference
to the latter case. The Lockhart case was decided nine years before the
Winley case, yet no reference is made in the latter to the former. The
court held in the Lockhart case that insurance against loss by fire,
effected by one without insurable interest in the property, was a wager-
ing contract not sanctioned by common law and was therefore void.
The presence or absence of innocence in effecting the insurance was
given no consideration at all by the court.
Whether the theory adopted by the court in the Sawyer case was
repudiated by the Winley case or the Lockhart case, it may be observed
that the courts of the state, after apparently having got off to a bad
start, early adopted the theory that insurable interest was necessary to
support a contract of insurance. The rationale behind this requirement,
as conceived 'by the courts, is clearly stated in the Winley case:
"As the assured had no insurable interest in the life of the cestui que
vie the contract was simply a wager; it was a mere gambling specula-
tion. The assured was not to be imdemnified against loss, injury or
disadvantage in any respect growing out of the life he insured; the
insurance was not intended to serve any legitimate business purpose or
end-it was purely a matter of speculation founded upon nothing but
1
, Stevens v. Ely, 16 N. C. 493 (1830).
108 N. C. 357, 12 S. E. 839 (1891).
1987 N. C. 149, 42 Am. Rep. 514 (1882).
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hazard. Such contracts and speculations are wholly unnecessary; they
cannot serve or promote any useful and wholesome purpose of indi-
viduals, society, or government. They do not stimulate, promote or
encourage industry, enterprise, legitimate business, sound morality, or
increase the wealth of the people or the strength and power of the
State. On the cohtrary, their nature and uniform experience go to
show that they represent nothing substantial or valuable, or of practical
advantage to persons or communities. They strongly tend to demor-
alize society and embarrass industries and general business. In their
very nature they stimulate, afford incentives to, and encourage those
who become parties to them to resort to sinister, oftentimes criminal,
means to turn or end the hazard in their favor, and thus gain unjust
and dishonest advantage. They encourage men to engage in the busi-
ness of speculation in hazard not necessary or useful in the general
purposes and business of life, but which is positively and seriously in-
jurious to them. Such contracts and speculations contravene the justice
and policy of the law-they are contra bonos mores, and are therefore
void."2 0
On the further point of what constitutes an insurable interest in
property, it was stated in Bank v. Assurance Co.21 that "any interest is
insurable if the peril against which insurance is made would bring upon
the insured by its immediate and direct effect, a pecuniary loss." The
view of the courts on the point of what constitutes an insurable interest
can be demonstrated best by considering the various interests which
have been held sufficient to support a contract of insurance.
Generally speaking, the courts of the state have held that any in-
terest, legal or equitable, is an insurable interest.22  More specifically,
it has been held that both a mortgagor and a mortgagee have an insur-
able interest in the property which is the subject of the mortgage ;u a
vendee of property with a bond for title has an insurable interest in the
property ;24 so has a tenant for life by curtesy ;25 so has one owning
property subject to an equitable charge;26 so have lienors in the
subject matter of the lien ;27 trustees or bailees for hire ;28 members
20 Burbage v. Windley, supra note 18, at 361-362.
21 188 N. C. 747, 125 S. E. 631 (1924).
2 Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. L. Ins. Assoc. of N. C., 125 N. C. 389, 34 S. E.
503 (1899).
23 Bryan v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 213 N. C. 391, 196 S. E. 345 (1938) ; Jeffrey
v. Boston Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 368, 162 S. E. 761 (1932); Wayne Nat'l Bank v.
Nat'l Bank of LaGrange, 197 N. C. 68, 147 S. E. 691 (1929); Federal Land Bank
v. Atlas Assurance Co., 188 N. C. 747, 125 S. E. 631 (1924); Stuyvesant Ins. Co.
v. Reid, 171 N. C. 513, 88 S. E. 779 (1916); Lockhart v. Cooper, 87 N. C. 149,
42 Am. Rep. 514 (1882).
2" Clapp v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Assoc. of N. C., 126 N. C. 388, 35 S. E.
617 (1900).
"In re Wilson, 224 N. C. 505, 31 S. E. (2d) 543 (1944) ; Stockton v. Maney,
212 N. C. 231, 193 S. E. 137 (1937).2 Bryan v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 213 N. C. 391, 196 S. E. 345 (1938).
"'Byrd v. Pilot Fire Ins. Co., 201 N. C. 407, 160 S. E. 458 (1931) ; Batts v.
Sullivan, 182 N. C. 129, 108 S. E. 511 (1921).
"
8Lockhart v. Cooper, 87 N. C. 149, 42 Am. Rep. 514 (1882).
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of partnerships in partnership property ;29 tenants in common of an
estate for life ;30 so has a tenant at will in crops sown, though title to
same, as security for payment of rent, by statute, rests in the landlord.81
The foregoing cases appear to be all of the law on the subject of
insurable interest in property in the state as revealed by the reported
cases. By and large, they cover the areas in which the problem most
frequently arises. Some of the situations which are apparently res
integra in the state, however, are: insurability of the interest of con-
tractors and builders in buildings in the course of construction; of
vendors of property where title to property is retained as security; of
lessors and lessees in the subject matter of the lease; of trustees and
cestui que trust in trust property; of stockholders in corporate property;
husband or wife in property, title to which rests- only in the other.
Although consideration of these relationships as a basis of insurable in-
terest has not been specifically undertaken, in view of the liberality of
the courts of the state in the matter of wbat constitutes an insurable
interest, and the further fact that in other jurisdictions such relation-
ships are generally deemed to give rise to insurable interest,3 2 one would
be warranted in concluding that they would be so regarded by the courts
of thi state.
One further point is worthy of mention before concluding the dis-
cussion of insurable interest in property, namely, the requirement as to
the duration of insurable interest, or, stated differently, at what time or
times must the interest in the subject matter of the insurance exist?
Only one case was found among the reported cases touching on this"
point, viz., the early case of Lockhart v. Cooper, in which the court
adopted, by way of dictum, the rule generally applied, namely, the in-
terest insured must exist both at the time the contract is' entered into
and at the time the loss occurs. The modern trend, born out of the
" Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 N. C. 389, 34 S. E. 503 (1899).
:'Houck v. Amer. Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 198 N. C. 303, 151 S. E. 628 (1930).
hi Batts v. Sullivan, 182 N. C. 129, 108 S. E. 511 (1921).
32 Amer. Equitable Assur. Co. v. Lumber Co., 225 Ala. 208, 142 So. 37 (1932)
(contractors and builders) ; Mahan v. Home Ins. Co., 204 Mo. App. 592, 226 S.
W. 593 (1920) (vendor retaining property as security); Hale v. Simmons, 200
Ark. 556, 139 S. W. (2d) 696 (1940) (lessor); Smith v. Royal Ins. Co., 111 F(2d) 667 (1940) (lessee); Haywood v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 285 S. W.
144 (Mo. App. 1926) (trustee); Cummings v. Dirigo Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112
Me. 379, 92 A. 298 (1914) (cestui que trust); Riggs v. Commercial Mut. Ins.
Co., 125 N. Y. 7, 25 N. E. 1058 (1880) (stockholders in corporate property). The
cases are not uniform on the question of whether a husband or wife has an in-
surable interest in the separate property of each other based solely upon their
marital relation; the present rule, which is a product. of statutes emancipating
married women, appears to be that, in the absence of statute giving one interest
in the property other than the common law interests, they have no insurable in-
terest in such property. Ohio Valley F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs, 216 Ky. 535,
287 S. W. 969. 971 (1926).
" 87 N. C. 149, 42 Am. Rep. 514 (1882).
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necessities of business, has, however, been away from this rule.34 The
practice existing in business of taking out policies of insurance on prop-
erty presently owned and to cover property to be acquired subsequently,
e.g., in the case of constantly changing merchandise inventories, has, re-
quired an abrogation of the requirement that an interest exist at the
time the policy is taken out. This view, although not uniformly followed
at the present,3 5 is a common sense attitude toward the problem; even if
the "wager prevention" theory of the requirement of insurable interest
be invoked, the presence of an interest at the time of the loss is suffi-
cient to negative any intimation of wagering. This view may be further
substantiated by the fact that assignments with the permission of the
insurance company permit the assignees to recover although they had
no insurable interest at the time the policy was effected, assuming, how-
ever, that the consent of the insurance company is not deemed a
"novation."
III. INSURABLE INTEREST IN LivEs
The matter of insurable interest in lives generally raises more
problems than are encountered in connection with insurable interest in
property. This stems chiefly from the fact that insurance on life in-
volves problems peculiar only to this type of insurance contract and, in
addition, involves those which are also characteristic of other types of
insurance contracts. In the main, as was stated previously, insurance
on life is not secured for purposes of indemnity, but as an investment.
At times, however, as when insurance is taken out on the life of a debtor
by a creditor, or a corporation on the life of a valued employee, the
contract partakes of one of indemnity, and, thus, in this connection rules
applicable to insurable interest in property might properly be invoked.
A consideration of the cases will show that much of the confusion that
developed in connection with the determination of what constitutes an
insurable interest in life was the result of this duality of purpose of life
insurance. The courts have frequently failed to keep properly distin-
guished the use of life insurance for purpose of indemnity from its use
as an investment and, as a result, have frequently been, inconsistent as
well as illogical in their conclusion. For example, as to the duration
of insurable interest, the rule as to property is that such interest must
,exist at the time of the loss; in life insurance, the rule is the reverse,
i.e., insurable interest need exist only at the inception of the contract;
"See California Insurance Code (Dearing 1944) §286: "An interest insured
must exist when the insurance takes effect, and when the loss occurs, but need not
exist in the meantime"; Sun Ins. Co. of London v. Merz, 64 N. J. L. 301 45 A 785(1900); Sawyer v. Dodge County Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 503 (18755; VANCE,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 143.
"'See Lockhart .v. Cooper, 87 N. C. 149, 151, 42 Am. Rep. 514 (1882); I
COOLEY's BaIEs or INsURANcE (1905) 137.
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what happens thereafter is immaterial.3 6 Now, if the purpose of the
life insurance contract be that of investment, the rule applicable to life
insurance is quite appropriate; on the other hand, if the purpose of the
contract is indemnification, then the invocation of the rule validating the
insurance if interest existed only at the inception of the contract, i.e.,
the life insurance rule rather than the property insurance rule, has the
illogical result, for example, of permitting recovery by a creditor at the
death of the cestui que vie although the latter had repaid the debt before
his decease and the creditor had at that time no insurable interest in
his life.36' These problems can be better illustrated, however, by setting
forth in more detail the attitude of the courts in the different situations
in which the question of insurable interest in life has arisen.
A. INSURABLE INTEREST OF INSURED IN HIS OWN LIFE
In North Carolina, as elsewhere, there is the general requirement that
in order for one to recover on a policy of insurance written on the life
of another, he must have an insurable interest in the life of the person
insured.37 As to what constitutes such an interest, the Supreme Court
of the state ruled, in the early case of Trinity College v. Insurance Co.,38
a landmark case in the state on the question of insurable interest in
lives, that "to have an insurable interest in the life of another one must
be a creditor or surety, or be so related by ties of blood or marriage as
to have reasonable anticipation of advantage from his life, or such an
interest arising from the relation of the party obtaining the insurance,
either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from ties of blood or
marriage to him as will justify a reasonabl& expectation of advantage
or benefit from the continuance of his life."3 9 This definition, though
generally accepted, is applicable only to the situation where the insurance
is taken out by someone other than the insured, for the general rule is-
in North Carolina and elsewhere-that every one has an insurable in-
terest in his own life which will warrant his taking out insurance on
his own life, in any amount, and making the proceeds payable to whom-
"
8 See Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251, 254
(1877) ; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 149.
3'& Empire Development Co. v. Title G. & T. Co., 225 N. Y. 53, 58, 121 N. E.
468 (1918). See note 46 infra.3 Atkins v. Cotter, 145 Ark. 326, 224 S. W. 624 (1920); Trinity College v.
Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, 113 N. C. 245, 18 S. E. 175 (1893) ; Wurzburg
v. New York L. Ins. Co., 140 Tenn. 59, 203 S. W. 332 (1918).
S113 N. C. 245, 18 S. E. 175 (1893).
Id. at 247, 18 S. E. at 176. It is interesting to note that the question of in-
surable interest, contrary to the normal situation, arose in the Trinity College case
by an attempt on the part of the beneficiary-assured to obtain the cash-surrender
value of the policy. For a discussion of the statutory change made in 1925 (now
N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §55-26, giving religious, charitable and educational
institutions an insurable interest in the lives of former student or friends), pur-
portedly as the result of the Trinity College case, see (1925) 8 N. C. L. REv. 146.
19461
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soever he chooses, whether such a designee be a relative, a creditor or
a stranger.4 0 In Albert v. Insurance Co.,41 the court posed the view
thusly: "The jury, as instructed by the court, found that the plaintiff
had no insurable interest; but they also found that the insured had her-
self taken out the policy and paid the premium. The finding, in support
of which there was at least a scintilla of evidence disposes of that de-
fense and all exceptions based thereon. It is, therefore, unnecessary
for us to decide whether a step-daughter has an insurable interest....
There can be no doubt that a policy of insurance is valid when taken
.out in good faith and the premium paid thereon by the insured. '
42 It
is observable from this statement by the court that the right of one to
insure his life in favor of one who otherwise has no insurable interest
therein is not unrestricted; the policy must be taken out in good faith
and not as a cloak for illegal wagering agreement. The bona fides
of the transaction is generally tested by whether or not the insured takes
the initiative in procuring the insurance and pays at least the first pre-
mium. While the absence of either or both of these two factors does
not necessarily imply a pre-conceived plan to wager on the life of the
insured, it may be grounds for such a finding by a jury. In most of the
North Carolina cases the court has emphasized the presence of these
two factors, viz., procurement of the insurance by the insured and pay-
ment of the premiums by him, intimating that the presence of these
factors was fundamental to the decision. 43  Where these factors are
present, or at least the first, there is no doubt that the insured may in-
sure his own life for the benefit of another, irrespective of the insurabil-
ity of the interest of the latter.
B. INSURABLE INTEREST OF THIRD PARTIES IN INSUP.ED'S LIFE
Before discussing the various groups of persons who come within
this designation, it may be stated that this category of beneficiaries is
restricted to the situation where the third party beneficiary initiates the
contract for his own benefit and pays the premiums due thereon. It is
this group with which the problem of insurable interest is chiefly
concerned.
Creditors. In North Carolina, as elsewhere, creditors are deemed
to have an insurable interest in the life of their debtors.44 However, the
"
0 Howell v. Amer. Nat'l Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 212, 126 S. E. 603 (1925);
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 151. Cf. N. C. Const., Art. X, sec. 7: "The
husband may insure his own life for the sole use and benefit of his wife and.
children...."
1 122 N. C. 92, 30 S. E. 327 (1898).
"Id. at 94, 30 S. E. at 327.
"See Powell v. Dewey, 123 N. C. 103, 104, 31 S. E. 81 (1898) ; Albert v. Mut.
L. Ins. Co. of New York, 122 N. C. 92, 94, 30 S. E. 327 (1898).
"' Miller v. Potter, 210 N. C. 268, 186 S. E. 350 (1936) ; Mace v. Provident
Life Assoc., 101 N. C. 122, 7 S. E. 674 (1888); Maynard v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.,
132 N. C. 711, 44 S. E. 405 (1903) (by implication).
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very perplexing question of what must be the proportion between the
amount of the debt and the amount of insurance procured has not been
raised in the state thus far. The general rule on this point is, however,
that the amount of insurance obtained must not be too disproportionate
to the amount of the debt.4 5 The courts have generally held that in-
surance to cover the amount of the debt, prospective premiums and
interest is not too disproportionate an amount.4 5' Also, the problem of
the effect of payment of a debt before the death of the debtor upon the
ability of the creditor to collect on the policy is still open. Outside of
the state, upon the theory that insurable interest in life need exist only
at the inception of the policy, the rule is that the creditor's interest does
not cease upon the payment of the debt by the debtor.4 6 It is question-
able whether this should be the rule, for as was intimated before, in-'
surance on the life of the debtor is not for purposes of investment, but
for indemnity; so, when the debt is paid, there is no chance for loss to
the creditor. On the point of possible loss of premiums paid by the
creditor, the availability of cash surrender value in the ordinary policy
would enable the creditor to recoup a portion of such premiums.
Relation by Blood or Affinity. The prevailing rule here is that mere
relation by blood is not of itself sufficient to give an insurable interest, 47
exception being made generally where the relationship is that of parents
and minor children, and vice versa.4 8  Outside of this exception, in
"' Exchange Bank of Macon v. Lob, 104 Ga. 446, 31 S. E. 459 (1898). But cf.
Fehr v. Cawthon, 293 F. 152 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923). See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d
ed. 1930) 165. It has been held that where there is excess insurance, the debtor's
estate is entitled to the excess, irrespective of the fact that the creditor might have
paid all of the premiums. Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, supra.
" It would appear that such a rule as this would permit taking out insurance
for any amount. Take as an example a debt of ten dollars: ten dollars worth of
insurance is necessary to cover the debt. The prospective premiums on ten dollars
worth of insurance for the life expectancy of the debtor is, for example, ten plus
dollars. The result is that under the rule, the creditor will be permitted to take
out twenty dollars worth of insurance to recoup his expected outlay, viz., prospective
premiums plus the amount of the debt. But, the premium on twenty dollars worth
of insurance is twenty dollars; so, the creditor will have to take out forty dollars
worth of insurance to cover his expected outlay, and so on, ad infinition. Up to
this point no provision has yet been made for interest on the creditor's outlay.
The courts do not, as a matter of fact, however permit this sort of pyramiding of
premiums [but cf. Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238, 22 A. 862 (1891)], which
means that a creditor can only recover his outlay, if ever, in cases where the
debtor dies soon after the insurance is obtained, or where he fails to measure up to
his life expectancy.
- "In the United States it seems clear that,' where the creditor procures in-
surance independently, his right to the proceeds is not affected by the state of
accounts between him and the debtor-insured at the time of the latter's death."
VANCE , INsURAxCE (2d ed. 1930) 150, n. 47.
" Wharton v. Home Security L. Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 254, 173 S. E. 328 (1934);
Crump v. Southern-Dixie L. Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 439, 168 S. E. 514 (1933) ; VANCE,
op. cit. supra note 46, at 157.
S Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. (2d) 169 (1940);
Crismond v. Jones, 117 Va. 34, 83 S. E. 1045 (1915). See Nat'l Life & Acc. Ins.
Co. of Nashville, Tennessee v. Alexander, 226 Ala. 325, 147 So. 173, 174 (1933).
3946]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
addition to the relationship it must appear that the one obtaining the
insurance must be in a position to benefit pecuniarily from the continued
existence of the insured, or to suffer possible pecuniary detriment by
his death.4 9 Also, it is usually accepted without question that husband
and wife have an insurable interest in the life of each other; this is
apparently the view in North Carolina, for no case on this point has as
yet come before the courts.5 0 It has 'been held, however, that the rela-
tionship of uncle and nephew does not of itself give an insurable in-
terest;51 nor does that of half-sister ;2 nor that of niece ;13 nor that of
cousin.5 4 It was held in Webb v. Insurance Co.,55 however, that the re-
lationship of brother was alone sufficient to constitute an insurable in-
terest. There is no uniformity among the courts on this latter point.
In the Webb case, the Supreme Court, stating that the matter was one
of first impression in North Carolina, reached its conclusion, saying:
"But we think the better reasoning supports the view that close rela-
tionship by ties of blood between brothers is alone sufficient to constitute
insurable interest even when the beneficiary takes out the policy and
pays the premium thereon." 58 While the soundness of the result reached
in the Webb case is not necessarily to be doubted, it is questionable
whether, when the rule is that relationship by blood is not alone suffi-
cient to give an insurable interest, an arbitrary distinction should be
made in the case of the relationship of "brother." If the theory of the
Webb case is followed to its logical conclusion, it would appear that,
although the point has not yet 'been before the court, parents and children
who have reached their majority would have an insurable interest in
the lives of each other, although it appears by the prevailing view, out-
side of the state, that such a relationship does not of itself give an
insurable interest. 57
In Slade v. Insurance Co.,58 the Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiff could not collect on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant
company upon the life of an alleged adopted son. The court ignored
"Cronin v. Vermont Life Ins. Co., 20 R. I. 570, 40 A. 497 (1898) ; VANcE,
op. cit. supra note 46, at 158.
"Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §52-9: "Any feme covert in her own
name, or in the name of a trustee with his assent, may cause to be insured
for any definite time the life of her husband, for her sole and separate use ..
"I Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 70 S. E. 822 (1910).
"CGrump v. Southern-Dixie L. Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 439, 168 S. E. 514 (1933).
v. Home Security L. Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 254, 173 S. E. 328 (1934)
"'See Mace v. Provident Life Assoc., 101 N. C. 122, 7 S. E. 674 (1888).
55216 N. C. 10, 3 S. E. (2d) 428 (1939).
"Id. at 11-12.
S Life Ins. Clearing Co. v. O'Neill, 106 F. 800 (C. C.A. 3rd, 1901) ; Worthing
-v. Curtis, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 419 (Court of Appeals 1875). But cf. Parish v. Mis-
souri Mut. Assoc., 8 S. W. (2d) 1018 (Mo. App. 1928) (adult son has insurable
interest in life of mother).S202 N. C. 315, 162 S. E. 734 (1932).
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completely the allegation of adoption; this was probably due to the fact
that the plaintiff apparently had not legally adopted the insured. Al-
though it is not apparent what would have been the effect of legal
adoption on the question of insurable interest at the time the Slade case
was decided, under the present statutory provision5 9 the relationship of
parent and child is established between parties to an adoption, thus rais-
ing a basis for insurable interest.
Partners. In North Carolina, partners have an insurable interest in
the lives of each other under certain conditions.6 ° , The principal case
in the state on this point is Powell v. Dewey.61 In that case, the plain-
tiff, as executrix of the insured, sued the defendant Dewey, former,
partner of the insured, to recover from the latter the proceeds of a policy
of insurance written on the life of the insured which had been paid the
defendant by the insurance company. Plaintiff contended that as de-
fendant has no insurable interest in the life of the insured, where recov-
ery was permitted under the policy by the insurance company, the estate
of the insured was entitled to the proceeds. The basis of plaintiff's
contention of lack of insurable interest in the defendant was that at the
time the policy was taken out on the life of the insured ,the partnership
relationship between the parties was about to cease, and as the insured
was not indebted to the partnership, the latter had no insurable interest
in his life. The court sustained the contention of the plaintiff on the
point of inability of defendant to collect on the policy because of lack
of insurable interest, but held that for the same reason neither could
the plaintiff, as representative of the estate of the deceased, maintain
an action based on the policy.62 The court's rulirig on the point of in-
surable interest, in spite of the general rule that insurable interest in
life need exist only at the inception of the contract, appears to be
founded in reason. The theory of insurance on the lives of partners is
not that of investment, but of indemnification-to recoup to the business
loss resulting from the death of the insured. Thus, to permit insurance
in instances where such persons' connection with the business is not a
vital factor in its existence or its ability to make profits (a fact which
may be evidenced by severance of connection with the business for rea-
sons other than death before its termination without disrupting it as a
50 N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §48-6 provides: ". . . Further, for all other
purposes whatsoever (after consideration of right of succesison to property) a
child adopted for life and his adoptive parents shall be in the same legal position
as they would be if he had been born to his adoptive parents...."00See Trinity College v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, 113 N. C. 245, 248,
18 S. E. 175 (1893).
81123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 81 (1898).
2 Cf. Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894), wherein the Texas
Supreme Court held that where the named beneficiary cannot collect on the policy
because of lack of insurable interest, he may collect under the policy as trustee
of the estate of the insured.
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going concern) would be to permit wagering no less than in other situa-
tions where there is no insurable interest in the life insured. If, in
situations of this nature, the insured was indebted to the partnership
at the time his connection therewith ceased, the partnership might be
permitted to insure his life on the basis of the relationship of debtor and
creditor.
Although the court held that no action could be maintained on the
contract of insurance because of the absence of insurable interest, it is
- questionable whether under the facts in the case-where the insurance
company did not avail itself of the defense of lack of insurable interest
in the beneficiary-the beneficiary should be allowed to retain the pro-
ceeds of the policy as against the insured's estate. The effect of per-
mitting him to do so is to allow him to recover in fact while at the same
time recognizing that he had no insurable interest. Of course, offsetting
this view is the accepted principle among the courts that no action of
any kind may -be maintained upon a contract void by reason of public
policy,6 but it is questionable whether or not an exception should not
be made in cases of this kind where the controversy is between the
beneficiary under the policy and the estate of the insured, the insurance
company having elected to pay.64 Weighing the relative position of the
parties, it would seem more in line with the public policy behind the
requirement of insurable interest to permit the insured's estate to claim
the proceeds,6 5 although the beneficiary may be allowed to retain an
amount equal to the premiums which were paid to keep the policy in
force 60 5
Finally, on the point of insurable interest of pariners in the lives of
each other, it might be noted by statute, partners are explicitly given
the right to insure the lives of each other where by agreement the right
to buy the shares of each other in the partnership arises upon the death
of a party so agreeing.68
"
3 Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant, 165 N. C. 453, 81 S. E. 606 (1914). Cf.
Burbage v. Windley, 108 N. C. 357, 12 S. E. 839 (1891). 5 WILisTON oN CoN-
TRACTS (rev. ed., 1937) §1630.
"4 Cf. 5 WLLISTON, loc. cit. supra note 63: "It is true that a court could only
under very exceptional circumstances enforce specifically an illegal bargain, but
the rule of public policy that forbids an action for damages for breach of such
an agreement is not based on the impropriety of compelling the defendant to pay
the damages; in itself that would generally be a desirable thing. When relief is
denied it is either because the plaintiff is a wrongdoer, and such a person the law
does not aid, or, in exceptional cases, because the transaction is declared abso-
lutely void by the law." As to whether policies lacking insurable interest are in
North Carolina void or voidable, see the discussion infra.
"'But cf. Smith v. Coleman, 52 S. E. (2d) 704 (Va. 1945), holding executors
of decedent's estate could not recover. This case is criticized in (1945) 45 Cor.
L. Rxv. 662.
:" Cf. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1882).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §58-204. This statutory change, made in
1941, is discussed in (1940-41) 19 N. C. L. Ra,. 490.
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Corporations. The question of insurable interest of corporations in
the lives of officers and employees is settled in North Carolina by ex-
plicit statutory provision. 67 This statutory provision was the outgrowth
of two. early cases, viz., Victor v. Mfg. Co.68 and Victor v. Cotton
Mills,"9 in which the Supreme Court, brushing aside the question of
whether or not a corporation had an insurable interest in the life of an
officer, sustained the plaintiff's petition for an injunction against the
company's carrying such insurance, on the ground that insurance by a
corporation on the life of officers or employees was an ultra vires act.
On the point of insurable interest, the situation in Victor v. Cotton
Mills 0 ' was analogous to that in Powell v. Dewey,70 in that the officer
whose life was insured was about to sever his connection with the cor-
poration, The court appeared to be of the opinion that, assuming that
a corporation had the power to insure the lives of its officers, it was
doubtful whether its insurable interest based on that relationship alone
could endure beyond their connection with the company. In Victor v.
Mfg. Co., 701 its companion case, however, although the officer was still
connected with the company, the same result was reached on the theory
that carrying insurance on the lives of officers was an act ultra vires the
corporation.
There is little need now to attempt to pass judgment upon these two
decisions, for the legislature was quick to the rescue, apparently realiz-
ing the necessity and appropriateness of corporations' obtaining insur-
ance on the lives of valuable officers and employees whose untimely death
may frequently take from the corporation services which it might well
take years to replace, the absence of these services, in the meantime,
resulting in decreased profits, which the proceeds of insurance are in-
tended to some extent to restore.
Before leaving the discussion of the insurable interest of corporations
in the lives of corporate officers and employees, it might, as an incidental
matter, be noted here that by explicit statutory provision stockholders
who otherwise have no insurable interest in the lives of each other for
any purpose where their sole relationship to'each other radiates from
and through the corporation, are given an insurable interest in each
others lives where agreement exists for the sale by one to the other of
his share in the corporation in the event of death.71
'" N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §55-26 provides: "... And when there
devolves upon an officer or agent of a corporation such duties and responsibilities
that a financial loss would result to the corporation from the death and consequent
loss of services of such officer or agent, the corporation has an insurable interest
in, and the power to insure the life of, the officer or agent for its benefit...."
"148 N. C. 119, 61 S. E. 653 (1908). "148 N. C. 107, 61 S. E. 648 (1908).
&*Id. 123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 81 (1898).7o 148 N. C. 119, 61 S. E. 653 (1908).11 N. C. Gnn. STAT. (Michie 1943) §58-204. Discussed in (1940-41) 19 N. C.
L. REv. 490.
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C. ASSIGNMENT TO ONE HAVING NO INSURABLE INTEREST
The rule here is that one may make a valid assignment of a policy
of insurance to one having no insurable interest in his life, where the
policy was taken out in good faith by the insured prior thereto and
made payable to his estate. This rule is a logical extension of the rule
that one may in good faith take out insurance on his life and make
whomsoever he elects the beneficiary. With a few exceptions it pre-
vails throughout the United States,7 2 and, despite some veiws to the
contrary, appears always to have been the rule in North Carolina."3
Here, as in other jurisdictions, however, the courts have frequently ap-
plied this rule to factual situations which were not in fact the type of
assignments contemplated 'by the rule. The rule is applicable to the
situation where the transfer of the policy takes place after there has
been an issue of the policy to the insured in his own right, and not the
situation in which the assignment is contemporaneous with the issue of
the policy, the assignee paying the first and all subsequent premiums.1 4
The effect of the latter transaction is, in the final analysis, the same as
in situations where the contract is in the first instance taken out by
parties who have no insurable interest in the lives they purport to insure.
The failure of the courts to distinguish these situations is illustrated
by Hardy v. Insurance Co.1 5 and Johnson v. Insurance Co.76 In the
GrigsbyFv. Russell, 222 U. S. 149, 56 L. ed. 133 (1911) ; VANcE, INSURANCE
(2d ed. 1930) 167.
"In Rylander v. Allen, 125 Ga. 206, 53 S. E. 1032 (1906), the Georgia Su-
preme Court, without citing any cases to support its contention, listed North
Carolina among those states which required an assignee of a life policy to have
an insurable interest. On this point, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court,
in Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 70 S. E. 822 (1910), said, at 290:
"Undoubtedly, however, there are decisions which directly hold that a life insurance
policy, though valid at its inception may not be assigned to persons having no in-
surable interest in the insured; and North Carolina has been referred to as up-
holding this view both in the textbooks and in decisions of other courts. If this
is a correct interpretation of our cases on the subject, we would not hesitate to
hold that they were not well decided; but, while some of' them certainly give
color to this view, we think that a more careful consideration of our decisions
will disclose that in all of them, where the contract was declared void or set
aside, it appeared that the assignment of the policy to one having no insurable
interest was made in pursuance of a preconceived purpose, and that the assignee
had suggested the arrangement or had been a party to it."
A reference to the assignability of life policies in North Carolina is made in
Van Hecke, North Carolina Annotations-Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
(1934-35) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 116.
"' See Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life (1918) 18 COL. L. Ray. 381, 389.
Cf. Fehr v. Cawthon, 293 F. 152 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), distinguishing Warnock v.
Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1882) (one "termed" assignee could not col-
lect face value of policy where he lacks insurable interest) from Grigsby v. Rus-
sell, 222 U. S. 149, 56 L. ed. 133 (1911) (assignee in good faith may recover al-
though he has no insurable interest). In the Cawthon case, at 153, the court said:
"We cannot see that the rule of Warnock v. Davis can now go beyond a case
where the original payee, or the one who, by simultaneous arrangement, is to be
assignee, does not have the required interest.. .. "
" 152 N. C. 286, 70 S. E. 822 (1910). " 157 N. C. 106, 72 S. E. 847 (1911).
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Hardy case the court sustained as valid an assignment which was made
contemporaneously with the issuance of the policy to an assignee, a
nephew of the insured, who paid the first and all subsequent premiums
thereon. The court held that although the mere relationship of uncle
and nephew would not alone give rise to an insurable interest, the
nephew might recover on the policy as the assignee thereof. The John-
son case was decided approximately one year after the Hardy case. The
court held it to be indistinguishable from the latter, although, as a
matter of fact, the assignment in the Johnson case was independent of
and took place some time after the issuance of the policy, a fact which,
though not conclusive of the bona fides of the transaction, tends to
negative any possible imputation of wagering. In situations like that
presented in the Hardy case it is difficult to conceive of a bona fide
assignment for value, for at an early period in the life of the cortract
there is likely to be little of value to assign and little worth purchasing.
It is an almost unavoidable conclusion that the purpose of such trans-
action is the evasion of the requirement of insurable interest. In Hin-
ton v. Insurance Co.,7 7 the Supreme Court held that where an agreement
for assignment existed before the policy was taken out, the assignee
could not recover on the policy. Thus recognizing this latter rule, the
courts should be careful to distinguish assignments of the Hardy type
from that which existed in the Johnson case.
The use of life insurance policies for purposes of investment war-
rants adoption of the view that, where taken out in good faith, they
may freely be assigned. If the insured is denied the right to dispose of
his insurance policies, which are frequently valuable, if not the most
valuable of his assets, to persons excepting those who have an insurable
interest in his life, the value of his insurance as an investment is mate-
rially decreased, for not too infrequently the only source from which
an insured may realize the full measure of this investment is by assign-
ment to persons having no insurable interest in his life. And, neces-
sarily, such persons would not accept assignment for value where
realization on the contract would be denied by the courts. It would
appear that where the policy of insurance had a bona fide inception, the
assignment of the contract is no more of a wager than insurance on the
life of a debtor by a creditor.
D. MISCELLANEOUS ON INSURABLE INTEREST IN LIFE
The problems of insurable interest in connection with life insurance
policies issued by fraternal orders and societies have been more or less
narrowed by court decisions and statute. It was held by the courts
78
7 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474 (1904).
"Wooten v. Grand fnited Order of Odd Fellows, 176 N. C. 51, 96 S. E. 654
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that such organizations may legally restrict the class of persons who
may be beneficiaries under policies they issue. This restriction is now
made mandatory by statute.7 9 However, the problem of whether or not
a given person comes within the restricted class7 of beneficiaries some-
times arises. This is illustrated by Applebaum v. Commercial Travel-
ers,80 where the Supreme Court held that a bigamous wife was not a
wife within the meaning of the constitution and by-laws of the defend-
ant society and therefore, could not recover as beneficiary under the
policy of insurance issued by it.
Aside, possibly, from Powell v. Dewey,81L the question of the duration
of insurable interest in life appears not to have been raised thus far in
the state. The prevailing rule is, as was pointed out before, that it need
exist only at the inception of the contract. Considering the attitude of
the court in the Dewey case, it is to be questioned whether in North
Carolina this rule would be applied to all cases involving the problem.
This theory is to some extent borne out by a provision in the statutes
applicable to fraternal insurance: The statute provides that where a
husband and wife are divorced, each 16ses his ability to be the benefi-
ciary under the policy of the other.8 2  While this rule has not been
applied outside of fraternal insurance, it appears founded in logic and
reason and should be adopted generally, despite the fact that the con-
trary appears to be the rule prevailing outside of the state.83 Since, as
was stated before, life insurance has a dual purpose, sometimes partak-
ing of the nature of property insurance, i.e., for purposes of indemnifica-
tion, and at other times for investment purposes, the rule as to the
duration of insurable interest that should be applied should be deter-
mined by the purpose the particular contract of life insurance is de-
signed to serve.
IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
It is difficult to determine from the cases in the state just what is
the effect of the lack of insurable interest on the right to maintain
(1918); Applebaum v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 171 N. C. 435, 88
S. E. 722 (1916) ; Pollock v. The Household of Ruth, 150 N. C. 212, 63 S. E.
940 (1909).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §58-281 provides: "The payment of death
benefits shall be confined to wife, husband, relative by blood to the fourth degree,
father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother,
stepchildren, children by legal adoption, or to a person or persons dependent upon
the member, or, with the consent of the society, any charitable institution main-
tained by the society.. . . Within the above restrictions each member shall have
the right to designate his beneficiary. . .
o0 171 N. C. 435, 85 S. E. 722 (1916).
8x 123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 81 (1891), cited supra note 61.82 N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie 1943) §58-281.
8' Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Shaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251 (1887);
VANCE, op. cit. supra note 72, at 596. Contra: Lewis v. Lewis' Admr., 234 Ky.
227, 27 S. W. (2d) 575 (Tex. Comm. App., 1920). For the Texas rule on this
point see notes 4, 5, 6 supra.
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actions on contracts of insurance. This difficulty arises from the fact
that the courts have been noticeably inconsistent in their treatment of
this question. The theory of the court, as expressed in Slade v. Insur-
ance Co.,s 4 is that the absence of insurable interests voids the policy from
its inception and renders it unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
If this theory is adopted, should it be possible for an insurance com-
pany which has issued a .policy not based upon insurable interest to
waive lack of insurable interest? Should the presence of an incontest-
able clause in a policy preclude the defense of lack of insurable interest?
In answer to the first query stands Hardy v. Insurance Co.,85 in
which the Supreme Court ruled that where the agent of the insurance
company knew that the beneficiary had no insurable interest in the life
of the cestui que vie and the beneficiary had acted in good faith in tak-
ing out the policy, the insurance company was estopped to deny lack of
insurable interest. On the other hand, concerning the second question,
the court held in Wharton v. Insurance Co.8 1 that the policy of insur-
ance, void because of lack of insurable interest, could not be validated
by the presence of an incontestable clause in the policy; the contract
being against public policy, it could not be made good by any act of the
parties. If the theory of the Wharton case be correct, it is evident tht
the principle expounded in the Hardy case cannot logically be followed,
for if a contract is void by reason of public policy, neither should
estoppel, waiver nor any other act of the parties be able to revive it.
Whether the view that insurance contracts lacking insurable interest
are so utterly void that no actions may be maintained thereon is sound
or not, it is questionable whether it should be followed in all cases.
That the view should be applied when lack of insurable interest is. urged
by the insurance company as a defense to an action on the policy is not
to be denied; however, as was stated in connection with the discussion
of Powell v. Dewey, supra, it seems that public policy would be better
effectuated, in instances where the insurance company has elected to
pay, iby permitting the estate of the insured or some other through the
insured to collect the proceeds as against the beneficiary having no in-
surable interest, and this despite the usual rule that only the insurance
company can avail of the plea of lack of insurable interest.
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7 Maynard v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 132 N. C. 711, 44 S. E. 405 (1903); South-
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Finally, as to the effect of the incontestable clause on the lack of
insurable interest, the Wharton case is in line with the prevailing view,
viz., the incontestable clause is no bar to a defense based upon lack of
insurable interest.88
s Dakota Life Ins. Co. v. Midland Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, 18 F. (2d) 903
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927), rev'd on other grounds in 277 U. S. 346, 72 L. ed. 911(1928); VANcE, op. cit. supra note 72, at 829. Cf. American Trust Co. v. Life
Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706 (1917).
